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Abstract
In a circular neighborhood, each member has a left and a right neighbor with whom (s)he
interacts repeatedly. From their two separate endowment amounts individuals can con-
tribute to each of their two structurally independent public goods, either shared only with
their left, respectively right, neighbor. If most group members are discrimination averse
and conditionally cooperating with their neighbors, this implies intra- as well as inter-
personal spillovers which link all neighbors. Investigating individual adaptations in one's
two games with diﬀering free-riding incentives conﬁrms, through behavioral spillovers, that
both individual contributions anchor on the local public good with the smaller free-riding
incentive. Therefore asymmetry in gaining from local public goods allows to establish a
higher level of voluntary cooperation.
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1 Introduction
While there is ample evidence that individuals respond to those with whom they interact
repeatedly, it is still unclear how one interaction aﬀects another structurally independent1
interaction in which the same individual is involved. Recently, a wave of experimental studies
has focused on the issue of behavioral spillovers by analyzing subjects' behavior in multiple
games played either sequentially or simultaneously (see e.g. Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al.,
2012; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013; Cason and Gangadharan, 2013; Falk et al., 2013). Many
of them have found evidence of spillovers, and thus prove that structural independence does
not imply behavioral independence. These studies either confront diﬀerent game types (like
games of coordination and games of cooperation, e.g. Cason et al., 2012, or competitive and
cooperative games, e.g. Cason and Gangadharan, 2013; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013) or let
the same game type be played by overlapping player sets (e.g., one treatment of Falk et al.,
2013).
In this paper we focus on behavioral spillovers across games of the same type (public good
games). Our experimental setup embeds dual group membership in a circular neighborhood
of eight participants playing two structurally independent linear public good games for ﬁnitely
many periods, each with just one neighbor - the left or the right one - so that in total eight
games with overlapping two-player sets are played in each round. Structural independence of
these games is guaranteed by a separate endowment, separate payoﬀs, and a diﬀerent co-player.
Whereas the main, asymmetric, treatment features diﬀerent left and right free-riding incentives,
i.e. marginal per capita return, control treatments rely on symmetry.
Despite structural independence, we predict that one does not play each game separately and
that his/her behavior can aﬀect, over time, those with whom one is not directly interacting, since
an individual's good or bad experience with one co-player may aﬀect her or his interaction with
the other co-player. When not only the games but also the free-riding incentives are the same,
1An interaction is structurally independent if all parties involved are concerned only with their own payoﬀ
and if these payoﬀs depend only on the behavior of the involved parties, that is if the set of all parties involved
qualiﬁes as a cell according to the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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spillovers could not be attributed to their characteristics but only to behavioral eﬀects. This
may seem less obvious for the asymmetric treatment where diﬀerent free-riding incentives could
induce contributing diﬀerently, i.e. independently left and right, thus questioning behavioral
spillovers. Nevertheless, if the asymmetric treatment induce symmetry via not discriminating
between neighbors who contribute similarly, this would enhance behavioral spillovers.
The behavioral assumptions behind the existence of this kind of spillovers, in our view,
are that individuals are discrimination averse and conditional cooperators. An individual is
said to be discrimination averse when not wanting to treat neighbors diﬀerently. With such
an individual, behavior in one interaction is likely linked to behavior in the other interaction
what triggers an intra-personal behavioral spillover. Because of overlapping player sets, the
conditionally cooperating pairs of neighbors, furthermore, trigger inter-personal spillovers. Due
to this combination of intra- and inter-personal spillovers, to which we refer as purely behavioral
spillovers, the neighborhood is predicted to evolve as a whole.
Participants receive feedback information only on own payoﬀ relevant contributions by their
two neighbors and are thus free to react independently to each of them. However, if they
are discrimination averse, they may want to align their behavior in both games. When such
intra-personal spillovers apply to several members, who are conditionally cooperating2, inter-
personal spillovers arise and possibly spread. In this case, individual behavior may, over time,
aﬀect more distant neighbors with whom one is not directly interacting. Therefore behavior
may spread not only from one structural independent game to another but also aﬀect the whole
neighborhood.
We can describe individual group members as dual selves3 with the two selves of each
participant facing a diﬀerent neighbor4. We illustrate the interplay between the contribution
levels of the two selves in Figure 1: for each individual member i we denote by Li and Ri the
2As in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
3Ideas of multiple selves date back to Plato (see Allen, 2006) who distinguished between passion and reason
that can be related to systems 1 and 2 (see Kahneman, 2011); for recent discussions see Elster (2009).
4Due to dominance solvability (0-contributions are strictly dominant) each such self is a cell in the terminology
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), i.e. each of the 8 local 2-person linear public good games has two proper subcells,
one for each self of two interacting neighbors (see footnote 1 above).
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contribution level in the left, respectively right game with the left i− 1, respectively the right
i + 1 neighbor. The dashed bi-directional arrows indicate possible intra-personal spillovers,
triggered by discrimination aversion (da), whereas the two solid bi-directional arrows between
neighbors symbolize possible conditional cooperation (cc).
Figure 1: The interplay between intra-personal and inter-personal spillovers in our setup.
If one suﬀers when both selves are treating two equals diﬀerently, as postulated by discrimi-
nation aversion, an attempt to align both contribution levels could be triggered. Moreover, one
can indirectly justify this by assuming inequity aversion5. As both neighbors are symmetric
and should earn the same, aﬀecting their payoﬀs diﬀerently could generate inequality which
one wants to avoid. But then in the asymmetric treatment the question arises which free-riding
incentive should trigger the same left and right contributions. If individual contribution - align-
ing anchors on the larger (lower) contribution in both games, voluntary cooperation could be
enhanced (hindered) due to intra-personal spillovers.
We distinguish four (between-subjects) treatments: the main asymmetric treatment with
diﬀerent free-riding incentives on both sides and three control treatments featuring free-riding
incentives equal to the lower, the higher, and the average of the asymmetric one, respectively.
Discrimination aversion, in the sense of wanting to contribute similarly in both games, should
be stronger when the incentives are symmetric but may still exist when they diﬀer. To test
this robustness of discrimination aversion, our main treatment allows for diﬀerent free-riding
5See Fehr and Schmidt, (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels, (2000); for a survey, see Cooper and Kagel, (2016).
4
incentives in one's two games but maintains the symmetry of all eight members. Thus the
asymmetric treatment presents a worst-case scenario for testing our main hypothesis of purely
behavioral spillovers.6 Our results, in fact, conﬁrm purely behavioral spillovers, both for the
asymmetric and the symmetric treatments.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on related literature. The experimental
design is described in Section 3. Sections 4 states hypotheses and Section 5 analyzes the data.
The conclusions in Section 6 discuss our ﬁndings and the methodological issues involved. The
Appendix provides the English translation of the instructions for one treatment,7 inter-group
heterogeneity analysis, and additional data analysis.
2 On related behavioral spillovers studies
Spillover dynamics across diﬀerent and structurally independent games8, as in our setup is not
a new topic. Our study shares some aspects with other experiments on behavioral spillovers9
and, in particular, with Bednar et al. (2012), Cason et al. (2012), Savikhin and Sheremeta
(2013), Cason and Gangadharan (2013) and Falk et al. (2013).
Bednar et al. (2012) focus on a class of inﬁnitely repeated two-person binary action games
with overlapping player sets to test if choices diﬀer between isolated and simultaneous game play.
Similarly to our design, they position (four) players on a circle, maintaining constant interaction
with the left and right neighbor, but without informing participants about this. They consider
the eﬀects of cognitive load and behavioral spillovers linking individual choices across games.
Their evidence of both processes is related to entropy, a novel measure of behavioral variance.
6As it is well known (see e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988) there is a positive correlation between marginal per
capita return and average contributions to public good when games are played in isolation but whether such
correlation persists when public good games are jointly played is still an open question.
7The treatment diﬀers only in free-riding incentives. The whole set of instruction is available from the authors
upon request.
8 Learning from repeatedly playing the same − as well as structurally diﬀerent − (bidding) games has been
referred to as robust learning. According to the evidence, reviewed by Güth (2002), learning in playing the
same game quickly becomes weak, whereas conditioning on diﬀerent rules (i.e., on game types) is strong and
persistent.
9Theoretical analyses of multiple game plays have been provided by Samuelson (2001), Jehiel (2005) and
Bednar and Page (2007).
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More speciﬁcally, the authors argue (and provide consistent ﬁndings) that cognitive load has
the greatest eﬀect in games with high entropy while games with low entropy generate the largest
spillovers onto games with high entropy.
Cason et al. (2012) analyze minimum and median eﬀort games, played both simultaneously
and sequentially with same and with diﬀerent group composition, to assess how behavior in one
game aﬀects behavior in the other. For the treatment with repeated simultaneous plays of the
two types of games, which is most comparable to our design, they ﬁnd eﬃcient coordination in
the minimum eﬀort game to occur less often than when the game is played after the median
eﬀort one, whereas there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence when it precedes the median eﬀort game. For
the treatments with simultaneous play and with the minimum eﬀort game preceding the median
eﬀort one, they also fail to reject the hypothesis that average eﬀort and average minimum eﬀort
are equal. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that simultaneous choices in the median game positively
aﬀects the choice in the minimum game while the opposite does not occur. In treatments with
sequential play experience with eﬃcient coordination in the median eﬀort game aﬀects behavior
in subsequent play of the minimum eﬀort game with the same group of subjects and this eﬀect
persists, though weakened, when group composition changes. The authors relate the existence
of these behavioral spillovers to two structural characteristics of the considered games, namely
strategic uncertainty (measured by entropy) and path-dependence, with the former being higher
in minimum eﬀort game and the latter stronger in the median eﬀort game.
Cason and Gangadharan (2013) focus on behavioral spillovers between a cooperative envi-
ronment (a threshold public goods game with stochastic provision) and a competitive environ-
ment (a double auction market). Without communication, cooperation in public good provision
is lower when subjects simultaneously interact in the double auction market whereas they do
not ﬁnd evidence that cooperation in public good game aﬀects market price competition. The
authors attribute this to the higher cognitive load of the simultaneous play.
Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013) analyze repeated plays of a lottery contest and a linear
public good game by ﬁxed groups of participants and ﬁnd that overbidding in the contest is
lower when it is played simultaneously with the public good game than when it is played in
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isolation. However, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in contributions to the public good when
it is played together with the lottery contest or in isolation. The authors argue that behavioral
spillovers can be attributed to diﬀerences in strategic uncertainty and path-dependence of the
two game types. Since the contest features larger average volatility of bids, as compared to the
average volatility of contributions to the public good, and contests are less path-dependent than
public good contributions, the authors predict and conﬁrm signiﬁcant spillovers eﬀects from the
public good game onto the lottery contest when the two games are played simultaneously.
Falk et al. (2013) study social interaction eﬀects both in a coordination and a cooperation
game. The latter features two identical linear three-person public good games with one common
player facing two diﬀerent co-player sets with whom one interacts repeatedly. This common
player confronts two structurally independent games, as each group member in our experiment,
but without a neighborhood structure. Furthermore, diﬀerently from our setting, participants
are not aware of being embedded in a larger matching group of nine participants who interact
directly but also indirectly via common co-players. While the authors ﬁnd evidence of social
interaction eﬀects (participants tend to contribute on average more to the group which has
contributed more in the previous period), they do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between average contributions in their two-group design and the control treatment with a single
group.
In our view, similar behavior when playing one rather than two games can be due to both:
that the two diﬀerent co-players in both games react similarly to the same behavior and that
they react diﬀerently to the only common player of both games when this player does not align
choices across games. Only in the latter case the ﬁnding of Falk et al. (2013) denies intra-
personal spillovers. Thus one would analyze whether and why the two disjoint co-player sets
behave diﬀerently and how this aﬀects their choices of the common co-player. Furthermore, in
three-person games one's two co-players can behave diﬀerently but still be, on average, equally
eﬃcient.
Less related are studies of sequentially played games. Knez and Camerer (2000) study how
precedent experience with eﬃcient coordination in weak-link games aﬀects play in a subsequent
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(repeated) Prisoner's Dilemma games with same subjects. Ahn et al. (2001) compare behavior
in coordination and one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games both with partner and with stranger
matching protocols. Brandts and Cooper (2006) focus on repeated play of weak-link games
with varying return from coordination by ﬁxed group of participants. Bernasconi et al. (2009)
are interested in the "unpacking eﬀect" (see Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997) and study "un-
packed" vs. "packed" public goods games.10 Evolutionary studies analyze or simulate how the
population, composed of exogenous behavioral types, evolves when ﬁtness is measured by ac-
tual proﬁts (see Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Noailly et al., 2007). Other experimental studies
explore the diﬀerent eﬀects of speciﬁc networks structures on cooperation (see Suri and Watts,
2011 and Fatas et al., 2010) or compare direct reciprocity and reinforcement learning (see Biele
et al., 2008). Finally, some studies do not maintain the structural independence of local public
good provisions (see McCarter et al., 2014).
One may also wonder whether and how purely behavioral spillovers, intra-personal or inter-
personal ones, are related to contagion eﬀects 11 and social diﬀusion dynamics (see, e.g., Cassar,
2007). Such social dynamics for an exogenously given network are denied by the benchmark
prediction based on common opportunism and backward induction based on ﬁnitely repeated
elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies. In view of common opportunism, how one in-
teracts with one neighbor should not matter for the interaction with the other neighbor, and
backward induction should unravel all voluntary cooperation. This clear benchmark prediction
is questioned not only by purely behavioral spillovers but also by contagion eﬀects and their
social diﬀusion dynamics.
10The "unpacking eﬀect" is known to occur also in economic situations like the evaluation of private com-
modity bundles (see, e.g., Diamond and Hausman, 1994; and Bateman et al., 1997).
11Contagion can occur intra-personally, i.e. between one's two selves, as well as inter-personally. However,
we do not refer to contagion which is better explored via repeated interaction experiments based on (random)
strangers matching.
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3 Experimental Setup
In the experiment, eight participants are randomly positioned in the circular neighborhood
of Figure 2 locating an individual participant i (lighter color) in the bottom position. When
interacting with the left i− 1, respectively right i + 1 neighbor, participant i's contribution is
denoted cLi , respectively c
R
i (see Figure 3). Contributions are integers ranging from 0 to 9.
<Insert Figure 2 here>
<Insert Figure 3 here>
For each two-player games, a participant receives an endowment of 9 experimental currency
units (ECU, with 1 ECU corresponding to 1 euro) in every period. In the left (right) interaction
the constant gain from one unit of public provision − the so-called MPCR − is αL (αR).
Participant i earns
[
9− cLi + αL(cLi + cRi−1)
]
+
[
9− cRi + αR(cRi + cLi+1)
]
= 18− (cLi + cRi ) + αL(cLi + cRi−1) + αR(cRi + cLi+1). (1)
Imposing 0 < αn < 1 < 2αn for n = L,R renders free-riding, i.e., c
n
i = 0 for n = L,R and
all i = 1, ..., 8, dominant and fully contributing, i.e. cni = 9 for n = L,R for all i = 1, ..., 8,
eﬃcient. The four treatments, Ta, Tl, Tm, and Th, diﬀer in their MPCRs. The main asymmetric
treatment Ta varies the free-riding incentive in one's left and right public good game with
αL = 0.6 and αR = 0.8, thus an additional contribution unit c
L
i , respectively c
R
i , generates a
return of 0.6, respectively 0.8. Although quite many experimental studies vary more or less
systematically the MPCR (for instance, Isaac and Walker, 1988; and more recently Cartwright
and Lovett, 2014), we are not aware of attempts varying them intra-personally as in treatment
Ta. Three symmetric treatments rely on aspects of the asymmetric one: treatment Tl with
9
αL = αR = min{0.6, 0.8} = 0.6; treatment Tm with αL = αR = (0.6+0.8)2 = 0.7; and treatment
Th with αL = αR = max{0.6, 0.8} = 0.8. We refer to Ta as our main treatment since it
features the worst-case scenario to validate purely behavioral spillovers. The control treatments
symmetrically capture the diﬀerent free-riding incentives of the main treatment Ta, namely
"lowest" via Tl, "mean" via Tm and "highest" via Th.
A challenge of purely behavioral spillovers and a familiar topic of supergame experiments is
endgame behavior, i.e. how far backward induction unravels voluntary cooperation. To allow
behavioral spillovers to be more systematically challenged by endgame behavior we distinguish
earlier and later termination by implementing a supergame experiment with an endogenous
restart12: constant neighborhoods play either 8 or 16 periods. Participants know that a su-
pergame will last for 8 periods with probability of 1/3 and for 16 periods with probability of
2/3 and only learn after period 8 whether the long or short horizon has been randomly selected.
Constant groups (i.e. neighborhoods) with eight participants each experience four successive
supergames. After each supergame, the same eight participants are randomly relocated within
the neighborhood guaranteeing that each participant has at least one new neighbor, i.e. reshuf-
ﬂing occurs within neighborhoods and not between them.
In each period of each supergame, all eight participants choose their contributions (cLi , c
R
i )
simultaneously being aware of αL and αR. After each period, feedback information is provided
only on own and the neighbors' contributions as far as they concern the own payoﬀ. To limit
income eﬀects across supergames, payment is the average payoﬀ of one (after the experiment)
randomly selected supergame.
For control treatments Tl and Th, we employed in total 48 and 40 subjects respectively, i.e.
6 and 5 independent groups; for treatments Tm and Ta a total of 96 subjects each, i.e. 12 inde-
pendent groups each. All subjects played four supergames but because of random restart the
number of observations diﬀers across treatments with the same number of participants. Each
session included two or three groups of eight participants and lasted about one hour.13 No
12We refer to this uncertainty as an endogenous restart possibility. We expected purely behavioral spillovers
to limit but not exclude endgame eﬀects (see Selten and Stöecker, 1986).
13Our setting takes into account Manski's (1993) reﬂection problem.
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subject participated in more than one session. Altogether, 280 participants self-registered for
participation through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) at CESARE lab (Luiss Guido Carli University).
Earnings (including a show-up fee of 5 euros) range from 11.4 euros to 32.4 euros, with an aver-
age of 20.55 euros. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
4 Hypotheses
We expect to conﬁrm some well-established results in public good experiments as a robustness
check for our design. Regarding the role of incentives we expect higher (lower) contribution
levels and smaller (larger) free-riding in treatments with higher (lower) MPCR. We also expect
declining voluntary cooperation up to endgame14 but a less striking in period 8 than in period
16 endgame eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we expect a recovery of voluntary cooperation in period 9 when
learning about the endogenous restart.
Our central hypothesis, also the basis of some more speciﬁc hypotheses, claims behavioral
spillovers across structurally independent local two-person public good games. In our view, such
spillovers arise through the interplay of both intra- and inter-personal spillovers as triggered
by discrimination (and indirectly by inequity) aversion as well as by conditional cooperation of
neighbor pairs.
Without intra-personal spillovers there would be no behavioral contamination between one's
left and right game. Thus our ﬁrst hypothesis presupposes
Hypothesis 1: subjects do not play their two local games independently but rather
correlate their contribution choice on their left and right side, even in Ta for which
we expect the weakest conﬁrmation.
One reason is equity theory as early discussed by Homans (1961). One wants to treat equal
others equally, similarly to the equality before the law. Since in our experiment all neighbors are
14See Andreoni (1988), the meta-study by Zelmer (2003) and the survey by Chaudhuri (2011).
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symmetric, this could be the main driver of intra-personal spillovers. Other possible reasons
for behaving similarly on both sides may be harmony seeking or avoiding the cognitive and
emotional costs of arbitrary discrimination or conditioning on the past.
Without inter-personal spillovers there would be no behavioral contamination between
neighbors' contribution to the public good. Thus our next hypothesis presupposes
Hypothesis 2: subjects are willing to reciprocate with both their neighbors in the
spirit of conditional cooperation.
Like, for instance, Fischbacher et al. (2001), we expect inter-personal spillovers to arise
because of conditional cooperation: subjects react to past choices of those with whom they
directly interact due to feedback information on own past outcomes and their neighbors' past
contributions on which they depend.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 together imply purely behavioral spillovers and possibly the co-evolution
of the whole neighborhood. Individual contributions on one side aﬀect, via intra-personal
spillovers, one's other contributions and, via conditional cooperation, also one's neighbor's
contributions, what allows for contamination across the whole neighborhood. Conversely, if
behavioral independence between the two games is veriﬁed, behavior will depend only on payoﬀ-
relevant contributions (own and that of the direct neighbor on the same side) and there will not
be contamination from one game to another. Behavioral spillovers thus presuppose conﬁrmation
of Hypotheses 1 and 2, which jointly imply
Hypothesis 3: behavioral spillovers arise through the interplay of intra- and inter-
personal spillovers and aﬀect the whole neighborhood.
Figure 1 illustrates the interplay of intra- and inter-personal spillovers: intra-personal
spillovers link left and right contributions although the two games are structurally independent.
Furthermore, inter-personal spillovers resulting from conditional cooperation link contributions
by neighbor pairs.
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If left and right contributions are MPCR-dependent, this could imply much smaller left
than right contribution for the asymmetric treatment. In the spirit of discrimination aversion,
however, some participants may still abstain from treating neighbors rather unequally.
5 Results
To conﬁrm the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the analysis proceeds as follows:
after investigating how free-riding incentives shape contribution choices and their dynamics in
the diﬀerent treatments, we test our speciﬁc behavioral hypotheses with the help of individual
choice data. Finally, we demonstrate how purely behavioral spillovers aﬀect the evolution of
voluntary cooperation of the whole neighborhood, based on average group behavior and its
dynamics.
5.1 Treatment eﬀects and contribution dynamics
Table 1 lists average and standard deviation of contributions across treatments and percentages
of free-riding, (cLi , c
R
i ) = (0, 0) contributions, in left and right games.
<Insert Table 1 here>
There is not much variation in standard deviations but considerable diﬀerences in average
contributions. As expected, contributions increase with MPCR: average contribution is lowest
in Tl (2.591) and highest in Th (3.872), with Tm in between (2.992)
15. In spite of equal average
free-riding incentives, average contribution in the asymmetric treatment Ta (3.478) exceeds that
of Tm, so that the average contribution in Ta is closer to Th - average than of Tl. The share
of free riding in Ta (14.88%) is lower than that in Tm (28.75%), and again closer to that in Th
(17.40%)16.
15Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix A also list average contributions separately for periods 1 − 8 and periods
9− 16, showing similar results.
16These diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (p = 0.000) using conservative two independent-sample t-test where the
unit of observation is frequency of (0, 0) contributions per supergame and aggregated across all periods.
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Statistically robust conﬁrmation of the eﬀects of incentives on average contributions is re-
ported in Table 2.
<Insert Table 2 here>
For treatment testing in case of non-independent observations we follow the approach pro-
posed by Moﬀatt (2016, pp. 84-85) and run an OLS regression of average group contribution
by period on single dummies for pairwise comparisons of treatments, clustering standard errors
at the group level in order to adjust for time dependence. Due to having eight individuals per
group and the rather low number of groups, the ultra-conservative approach (allowing only one
aggregate observation per matching group) is not feasible. Our (second-best) approach, which
clusters at the supergame per neighborhood level and results in 4 clusters per neighborhood,
allows us to exploit the unique structure and reshuing mechanism of our design17.
This analysis conﬁrms that, in the symmetric treatments, lower MPCR corresponds to a
signiﬁcantly lower level of average contribution and, interestingly, in spite of the same average
MPCR, contributions in Tm are signiﬁcantly lower than contributions in Ta (cluster-robust
p-values in parenthesis).
Result 1:
- in symmetric treatments, average contributions increase when the MPCR is
higher;
- the asymmetric treatment Ta triggers, in spite of the equal average productivity,
higher average contribution and less free-riding than Tm.
How average contributions to both public goods evolve in all treatments is graphically
presented in Figure 4. Average contributions in Ta ("Asymmetric" in the ﬁgure) are higher
than in Tm ("Medium" in the ﬁgure) in every period, which is consistent with Result 1.
17Participants of a group are reshued between supergames and guaranteed at least one new neighbor, while
most receive a completely new set of neighbors (91.66% have a diﬀerent neighbor on both sides).
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<Insert Figure 4 here>
As expected, average contribution declines over time with a more substantial drop in period
8, when participants do not know whether the supergame will end or not (ﬁrst endgame eﬀect).
However, voluntary cooperation recovers quickly in period 9 when learning that interaction
continues, although this recovery is nearly absent from treatment Tl. Contributions decline
more drastically in the last possible period (second endgame eﬀect)18.
Given the hierarchical structure of our data, we statistically conﬁrm these eﬀects via a
multilevel regression model19; in particular, when dealing with group contributions, we cluster
at the session, supergame and group levels (with the addition of treatment level when the
sample is pooled). Table 3 (and its full version, Table 13, in Appendix A) reports regression
results of average group contribution on supergame and period dummies using period 8 as the
reference category. The sample for this analysis is restricted to supergames lasting 16 periods
(see last row of Table 3) in order to test endgame and endogenous restart eﬀects on the same
pool of participants.
<Insert Table 3 here>
The coeﬃcients associated to period dummies statistically conﬁrm the descriptive analysis
of contribution dynamics. With the exception of treatment Tl, coeﬃcients increase in absolute
value until period 8 when contributions reach their ﬁrst lowest level because of the ﬁrst endgame
eﬀect. However, in period 9 (and 10) participants in treatment Tm and Ta revive cooperation
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conﬁrming the endogenous restart eﬀect. Finally, contributions drop more substantially in the
ﬁnal period, conﬁrming the second endgame eﬀect.
18These dynamics of contributions are in line with other linear public good experiments, e.g. Andreoni (1988),
and therefore represent another robustness check for our results.
19Even though our results are robust to other speciﬁcations (such as two-limit panel tobit estimation), we
believe that, because of the speciﬁc experimental design, the multilevel approach is the most appropriate since
it allows to handle both group and session eﬀects. Not using a two limit panel tobit estimation (i.e. not taking
into account the censored structure of our dependent variables) leads, in our case, to similar levels of signiﬁcance
but slightly reduces the magnitude of the eﬀects; see Moﬀatt (2016, pp. 92-97) for a discussion.
20Figures 4, 6a and 6b suggest that a restart eﬀect in period 9 is present also in Th. This is not conﬁrmed by
regression analysis, possibly because of smaller number of groups playing 16 periods in this treatment.
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Regarding the asymmetric treatment, we analyze separately the left and right MPCR eﬀect
on average contribution. Table 4 presents diﬀerences between average left (cL), resp. right
(cR) contribution in Ta, and average (left and right) contribution in treatments with the same
free-riding incentives, i.e. Tl, resp. Th. Both diﬀerences are positive, speciﬁcally more than
four times larger for the higher (Tl) than for the lower (Th) free-riding incentive. The fact that
average contribution in Tl is lower than average contribution in Ta,l shows that in presence of
asymmetry subjects tend to reduce the gap between right and left contributions, by anchor-
ing their contributions on the interaction in which they are more eﬃcient (right side). This
suggests that, when facing diﬀerent left and right free-riding incentives, repeatedly interacting
participants link their contributions more to the larger MPCR.
<Insert Table 4 here>
Table 5 reports statistical robust conﬁrmation of the eﬀect of the asymmetric free-riding
incentives on average contribution21. The analysis conﬁrms that contributions in Tl are lower
than those in Ta,l and also reveals that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between contributions
in Th and those in Ta,r.
<Insert Table 5 here>
Figure 5 visualizes the percentage share of zero, low (1, 2, 3), medium (4, 5, 6), and high
(7, 8, 9) contributions for all four treatments. In case of the asymmetric treatment, it distin-
guishes left and right contributions. The share of zero contributions, as discussed in Table 1, is
lowest in Ta,r ("Asymmetric right" in the ﬁgure) and Th ("High" in the ﬁgure). The peaks are
at low contributions for all treatments, except for Th where the peak is at the medium level;
ﬁnally, the share of high contributions in Ta,r is higher than in Th.
<Insert Figure 5 here>
21The same methodological remark concerning Table 2 applies here, therefore we once again follow the pro-
cedure suggested by Moﬀatt (2016, pp. 84-85).
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How average contributions to left and right public goods in treatment Ta evolve is represented
in Figures 6a and 6b. It is striking that left average contribution in Ta ("Asymmetric left" in
the ﬁgure) is nearly always above that of Tm ("Medium" in the ﬁgure) in spite of Ta's larger
free-riding incentive. Moreover there are almost no diﬀerences in the right average contributions
between Ta ("Asymmetric right") and Th ("High") for the ﬁrst eleven periods, which further
dynamically conﬁrms that participant anchor their behavior towards lower free-riding incentive.
<Insert Figures 6a and 6b here>
Result 2:
- participants in Ta tend to close the gap between left and right contributions;
- behavior in Ta is closer to that of Th than to that of Tl, i.e. participants tend to
anchor on the lower free-riding incentive in repeated interaction.
Overall, Results 1 and 2 constitute a robustness check for our design, since they provide
evidence of well-established patterns of behavior in public good experiments; moreover they
show some novel ﬁndings related to the innovations that characterize our design, such as the
endogenous restart eﬀect. Furthermore, these results provide preliminary evidence that partic-
ipants in the main asymmetric treatment Ta tend to be guided more by the lower free-riding
incentive, thus suggesting that intra-personal spillover may have occurred. To investigate these
issues, in the next section we provide an in-depth analysis of behavioral spillovers triggered by
the interplay of inter- and intra-personal ones.
5.2 Behavioral spillovers analysis
To demonstrate the existence of intra-personal spillovers, Table 6 reports correlations between
individual left and right average contributions together with the signiﬁcance level in parentheses.
Although structurally independent, the two public good games are not played independently:
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the correlation between left and right individual average contributions are high and signiﬁcant.
Albeit generally higher than 50%, correlation is lowest for Ta in all supergames due to its
asymmetric incentives.
<Insert Table 6 here>
Result 3: in spite of their structural independence, and in accordance to Hypothesis
1, average contributions to both local (left and right) public goods are behaviorally
interdependent.
Table 7 (a) displays the average contribution received by participants who contributed on
average at least seven ECU to both their neighbors in all but the last period (hereafter High
contributors) and the average contribution received by participants who are not high contrib-
utors (Everyone Else). Furthermore, Table 7 (b) presents the average contribution received by
participants who contributed on average at most two ECU to both their neighbors in all but the
last period (hereafter Low contributors) and the average contribution received by participants
who are not low contributors (Everyone Else).22 As the analysis presented in Table 7 (and
Tables 7, 14 and 15 in Appendix A) is based on reactions to feedback on neighbors' choices,
we exclude the last period of play, either 8 or 16, when deﬁning High and Low contributors,
as neighbors can not react to that feedback. For the same reason we exclude period 1 when
deﬁning average contributions of High and Low contributors' neighbors.
Tables 7 (a) and (b) suggest that High (Low) contributors trigger signiﬁcantly higher (lower)
conditional cooperation levels by their neighbors, compared to "Everyone Else" (p=0.000 for
both independent-sample t-test). In our view, this results is consistent with Hypothesis 2 since
it conﬁrms the prevalence of conditional cooperation among our participants.
Table 8 reports average left (right) contribution by participants whose right (left) neighbor
is either High Contributor (a), Low Contributor (b) or Everyone Else. Tables 8 (a) and (b)
22For High contributors, the threshold of at least seven ECU on both sides corresponds to the ninetieth
percentile of the distribution of average own left and right contributions. For Low contributors, the threshold
of two ECU is below the average contribution of all four treatments.
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reveal that participants with a High (Low) Contributor on one side contribute more (less) on
the opposite side than other participants (p=0.000 for Low contributors vs. Everyone else,
using a two independent-sample t-test; High contributors vs. Everyone else is also signiﬁcant
but the low number of observations, when aggregated, does not allow for enough test power).
This result is, in our view, evidence of intra-personal spillovers, as postulated by Hypothesis 1,
as it indicates that participants link their two contribution choices.
<Insert Table 7 here>
<Insert Table 8 here>
Tables 14 and 15 (in Appendix A) apply the analysis of Tables 7 and 8 only to treatment Ta
by distinguishing between left and right neighbor (due to diﬀerence in free-riding incentives).
The qualitatively similar results in Ta as in the other treatments − even for the low MPCR
(αL = 0.6) − reveal a striking interaction eﬀect of intra-personal and inter-personal spillovers:
in spite of their diﬀerent free-riding incentives, participants in Ta reciprocally behave in similar
ways in their two games.
Result 4: High (low) contributors positively (negatively) aﬀect the contributions of
their neighbors, who are not only conditionally cooperating and thereby inspiring
inter-personal spillovers, but also contribute more (less) to their other neighbor,
indicating intra-personal spillovers. This holds even in case of diﬀerent free-riding
incentives as in Ta. Altogether, this evidence supports Hypothesis 3 which postu-
lates that behavioral spillover arise through interplay of intra- and inter-personal
spillovers.
To validate these ﬁndings econometrically, we regress individual left (right) contribution in
period t on own lagged left (right) contribution, supergame, period, and contributions made by
both neighbors in period t− 1. We use a multilevel model with clusters at session, supergame,
group and individual levels (see Table 9).
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<Insert Table 9 here>
Table 9 shows that an individual's contribution on one side is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the
same-side neighbor's (lagged) contribution, as suggested by the evidence of conditional cooper-
ation, and also by the other neighbor's (lagged) contribution (except for the left contribution
in Tm and Th), in line with intra-personal spillover eﬀects. Finally, "supergame" is not system-
atically signiﬁcant whereas "period" has a small negative but signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (except for
cRi in treatment Th).
Result 5: one's left and right contributions depend signiﬁcantly on feedback (i.e.
on own lagged contribution, supergame and period) as well as, for most treatments
including Ta, on past contributions by both neighbors. On average, higher past con-
tribution by one's neighbor triggers higher present contributions to both neighbors,
thereby conﬁrming Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are jointly required by Hypothesis 3.
Summing up, the support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 strongly conﬁrm purely behavioral spillover
eﬀects, claimed by Hypothesis 3, for most treatments and both, left and right, games including
treatment Ta whose unequal free-riding incentives could have weakened, even questioned, such
spillovers.
5.2.1 Diﬀusion of behavioral spillovers
Due to the evidence of behavioral spillovers, each member's choice can indirectly aﬀect, over
time (periods), all other members. An important feature of our experimental design, involv-
ing overlapping sets of players, is that it allows to analyze if and how behavioral spillovers
spread throughout the whole neighborhood (i.e. Hypothesis 3). To shed light on such indirect
inﬂuences we analyze how contributions are aﬀected by the relative distance of public good
games. Since with longer delay, via periodic feedback, more contributions can inﬂuence present
ones, our assessment of distance eﬀects concentrates on the shortest delay by which one group
member i can possibly inﬂuence another one.
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Due to periodic feedback information it takes one period for member i to inﬂuence through
behavioral spillovers, members i + 1 and i − 1, while it takes at least four periods for her to
inﬂuence the most distant member i+4. For example, member i's contributions in period 1 can
aﬀect her neighbors' (members i+1 and i−1) contributions to their other neighbors (members
i + 2 and i − 2) in period 2, etc. until lastly the most distant (i + 4) member's contributions
can be inﬂuenced, via members i+ 3 and i− 3's contributions, only in period 4 (see Figure 7).
To trace distance eﬀects we compute the sum of contributions (potentially) aﬀected by
member i's contribution choices in k = 0, 1, 2, 3 lags. For example, when k = 1 (respectively,
k = 2, k = 3) we measure the sum of contributions to the public good games which take one
(respectively, two, three) period(s) to be aﬀected by member's i contributions. Obviously, when
k = 0 we compute the sum of contributions to the two public good games in which member i
is directly involved in.
The sum of contributions is denoted by Fi(t+ k), where t = 1, ..., 15 denotes period of play,
and it is computed as follows:
Fi(t+ k) = c
R
i−(k+1)(t+ k) + c
L
i−k(t+ k) + c
R
i+k(t+ k) + c
L
i+(k+1)(t+ k) for k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
With the help of this notation, we deﬁne the distance diﬀerence Dki as the absolute value of the
diﬀerence in aggregate contributions when k = 0 and when k = 1, 2, 3, as follows:
Dki (t) = |Fi(t+ k)− Fi(t)|, for k = 1, 2, 3,
The more or less delayed behavioral spillovers can be traced across the neighborhood via the
distance diﬀerences D1i (t), D
2
i (t) and D
3
i (t) for all members i = 1, ..., 8 and for all periods t
(excluding period 1623), supergames, and treatments: to reiterate, as feedback on neighbors'
contributions is received after every period, it takes one period to possibly aﬀect a public good
game that is one lag away, measured by D1i (t), two periods to aﬀect a public good game that
23We constrain our data analysis to all periods except for period 16, where endgame eﬀect should overpower
any spillover eﬀects.
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is two lags away, D2i (t), and three periods to aﬀect a public good game that is three lags away,
D3i (t). These distance diﬀerences are based on minimal delay by which Fi(t) may inﬂuence
Fi(t+ 1), Fi(t+ 2) and ﬁnally Fi(t+ 3).
<Insert Figure 7 here>
Table 10 (a) displays the average and standard deviation of the absolute value diﬀerences
D1i (t), D
2
i (t) and D
3
i (t) in contributions to public good games which are 1 (i.e., closest), 2, or 3
(i.e., furthest) steps away. It shows that despite being structurally independent, closer games
reveal a smaller absolute diﬀerence in contributions, compared to games further apart. We
view this as strong, albeit indirect, evidence of spillover eﬀects: without behavioral spillovers
there would not be such systematic diﬀerences in contributions depending on proximity from
one another.
Table 10 (b) validates econometrically this inﬂuence by a multilevel regression (clustered at
the treatment, session, group, supergame, and individual levels) which compares the diﬀerences
in contribution sums based on the proximity to the two public good games in which member i is
involved, for all members i = 1, ..., 8. It conﬁrms that structural independence of games does not
guarantee behavioral independence: proximity of games signiﬁcantly aﬀects their contribution
diﬀerences.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient between D2i (t) and D
3
i (t) in Table 10 (b) suggests that games
which are two steps away are more similar than those three steps away and this is an indication
that the interplay of intra- and inter- personal spillovers aﬀects the whole neighborhood and
let it evolve as a whole, supporting Hypothesis 3.
<Insert Table 10 here>
Figure 8 depicts absolute diﬀerences in contribution sums between public goods which are
1, 2, 3 steps apart, without lag, across all periods except the 16th. Contribution diﬀerences
increase mainly in the ﬁrst four periods of a supergame, which is the minimal number of periods
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needed for the whole neighborhood to become "aﬀected" via behavioral spillovers by a group
member. After period 4, contribution diﬀerences between diﬀerent distances stabilize. It seems
that contributions adjust across games with the shortest possible delay.
<Insert Figure 8 here>
The fact that the diﬀerences in contributions stabilize without decreasing questions that
neighborhoods become homogeneous in the level of cooperation due to behavioral spillovers
(see Appendix B). Such heterogeneity is in line with the robust evidence of usual repeated
public good experiments, especially with results showing that most but not all participants can
be deﬁned as reliable conditional cooperators.
6 Conclusion
We experimentally demonstrate that a constant neighborhood with eight members, who each
repeatedly plays two structural independent games, is more than the parallel play of isolated
games. Society members, although only bilaterally interacting, seem discrimination averse and
are often conditionally cooperating, letting their group evolve as a "whole". Speciﬁcally, they
try to establish a high level of voluntary cooperation which generally quickly recovers when
learning that the game goes on.
The main conclusion from our data analysis is that behavioral spillovers are pervasive. As
one's left play evolves strictly with right play, on the basis of such individual positive correlation,
most participants seem discrimination averse and link their behavior in both games. Therefore,
when participants are also conditionally cooperating, this also spills over interpersonally.
More speciﬁcally, this proves that:
- even across completely unrelated interactions we nevertheless generate our choice behavior
in a holistic way,
- local experiences, even when restricted to local feedback information only, can become
gradually appreciated by more and more others, and
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- unequal free-riding incentives as in treatment Ta may foster voluntary cooperation when
participants interact repeatedly.
The last point suggests that in repeated collective-action tasks we may be more inﬂuenced
by good, e.g. eﬃciency enhancing, experiences than by worse ones and that discrimination
averse participants anchor more on their better experiences. This could have an interesting
policy implication for reducing the costs of fostering cooperation when free-riding incentives
can be manipulated.
Our analysis distinguishes between intra-personal spillovers, due to discrimination aversion,
and inter-personal spillovers, due to conditional cooperation. Together they let neighborhoods
with eight participants evolve as a whole interrelated society in spite of its eight local games
being structurally independent. Actually, this allows us to trace how behavioral spillovers aﬀect
even more distant members across time. In future research it could be beneﬁcial to study more
closely how behavior ﬁrst spills over intra-personally and then inter-personally by considering
an experimental design which can provide even more informative data. In our neighborhood
setting, a player could react to the contribution of both neighbors via the strategy (vector)
method24 which would directly reveal intra-personal spillovers, even in simultaneous (left or
right) contributions. In particular, this will allow to better understand how a good or bad
experience in one's left or right game can immediately aﬀect also how one behaves in the other
game.
24See Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and Di Cagno et al. (2016) for experimental methods employing
leader/independent as well as follower/conditioning contributions.
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Tables and Figures
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You are participating in an experiment about economic decision-making. During the experiment, 
you can earn money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. 
These instructions describe the decisions you and other participants should take and how your 
earnings are calculated. Therefore, it is important to read them carefully. 
During the experiment, all the interaction between the participants will take place through 
computers. It is forbidden to communicate with other participants by any means. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to answer it. Keep in mind that the 
experiment is anonymous, i.e., your identity will not be disclosed.  
During the experiment, your winnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the 
points will be converted to euro at the following exchange rate: 
2 points = 0.5 € 
In the experiment you will be a member of a group containing a total of 8 members, including you. 
For the purpose of this experiment you and the rest of the members in the group are positioned in a 
circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbour to the left and a neighbour to the 
right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the experiment, each of you will interact with your two neighbors, and these two neighbors 
are going to be the same two individuals for 1 round.  In the experiment, there will be a total of 4 
rounds. One round lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as it will be explained later). Therefore you will have 
to make either  8 or 16 decisions before the round ends.  At the end of each round, your group 
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
Your	Right	
Neighbour	
You	
Your	Le3	
Neighbour	
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
Figure 2: The ci ular neighborhoo
Figure 3: The interacting neighbors
Tl Tm Ta Th Total
Average 2.591 2.992 3.478 3.872 3.183
Std. Dev. 2.327 2.762 2.523 2.808 2.650
Freq. 2,688 5,568 4,672 1,856 14,784
Share of (0,0) 23.85% 28.75% 14.88% 17.40% 22.05%
Table 1: Average contribution by treatment
Tl Tm Ta Th
Tl - -0.401 (0.154) -0.887
∗∗∗ (0.004) -1.281∗∗∗ (0.001)
Tm - -0.486
∗∗ (0.055) -0.880∗∗∗ (0.009)
Ta - -0.394 (0.260)
Th -
Table 2: Diﬀerence in average contribution. Cluster-robust p-values in parentheses
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Figure 4: Average contributions to both PG
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Dependent variable: average group contribution at period t
Pooled(i) T
(ii)
l T
(ii)
m T
(ii)
a T
(ii)
h
Supergame -0.194∗∗∗ -0.080 -0.315∗∗∗ -0.141 0.180
(0.059) (0.121) (0.085) (0.109) (0.136)
Period dummies. Ref. category: period 8
Periods 1-6 X X X X X
Period 7 0.486∗∗∗ 0.399∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 9 0.338∗∗∗ 0.024 0.446∗∗∗ 0.328∗ 0.528
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 10 0.437∗∗∗ 0.142 0.510∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.507
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Periods 11-16 X X X X X
Constant 3.221∗∗∗ 2.444∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗ 2.603∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.566) (0.365) (0.605) (0.665)
Observations 1,456 288 624 400 144
Supergames lasting 16 periods 65% 75% 81% 52% 45%
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
(i) Five level estimation (treatment, session, supergame and group)
(ii) Four level estimation (session, supergame and group)
Table 3: Multilevel regression of average group contribution. Sample is restricted to supergames
lasting 16 periods only
cL(Ta)− c
L(Tl) + c
R(Tl)
2
0.646
cL(Th) + c
R(Th)
2
− cR(Ta) 0.153
Table 4: Diﬀerences in left
(
cL
)
and right
(
cR
)
contributions (average values)
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Tl Ta,l Tm Ta,r Th
Tl - -0.646
∗∗ (0.031) -0.401 (0.154) -1.128∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.281∗∗∗ (0.001)
Ta,l - 0.245 (0.309) -0.482
∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.635∗ (0.066)
Tm - -0.727
∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.880∗∗∗ (0.009)
Ta,r - -0.153 (0.648)
Th -
Table 5: Diﬀerence in average contribution. Cluster-robust p-values in parentheses
Figure 5: Contribution ranges by treatment
(a) Average contributions to left PG (b) Average contributions to right PG
Figure 6: Average per-period Contributions to left (a) and right (b) PG
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Tl Tm Ta Th All
Supergame 1 0.687∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.639∗∗∗(0.000) 0.562∗∗∗(0.000) 0.802∗∗∗(0.000) 0.632∗∗∗(0.000)
Supergame 2 0.609∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.552∗∗∗(0.000) 0.507∗∗∗(0.000) 0.731∗∗∗(0.000) 0.581∗∗∗(0.000)
Supergame 3 0.535∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.630∗∗∗(0.000) 0.463∗∗∗(0.000) 0.755∗∗∗(0.000) 0.593∗∗∗(0.000)
Supergame 4 0.660∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.585∗∗∗(0.000) 0.615∗∗∗(0.000) 0.514∗∗∗(0.001) 0.607∗∗∗(0.000)
All 0.637∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.609∗∗∗(0.000) 0.548∗∗∗(0.000) 0.675∗∗∗(0.000) 0.609∗∗∗(0.000)
Table 6: Correlation of left and right individual average contributions of a given supergame
and across supergames for each treatment and across treatments; p - values in parentheses.
Average Std.Dev. Freq.
High contr. 6.528 2.218 866
Everyone else 3.042 2.202 12,798
(a) Contributions to High contributors
Average Std.Dev. Freq.
Low contr. 1.603 1.774 4,128
Everyone else 3.982 2.217 9,536
(b) Contributions to Low contributors
Table 7: Average contribution received by High/Low contributors vs. by others in the neigh-
borhood
Average Std.Dev. Freq.
High contr. 4.531 2.267 866
Everyone else 3.182 2.226 12,798
(a) Spillover eﬀect of High contributors
Average Std.Dev. Freq.
Low contr. 2.476 2.167 4,128
Everyone else 3.610 2.202 9,536
(b) Spillover eﬀect of Low contributors
Table 8: Eﬀect of neighbor's type (High/Low contributors) on individual contribution to other
neighbors
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Dependent variable: left contribution cLi (t)
Tl Tm Ta,l Th
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
cLi (t− 1) 0.300∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.319∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.381∗∗∗ (0.022)
Supergame -0.114∗∗ (0.057) -0.124∗∗ (0.056) -0.101∗ (0.052) -0.020 (0.081)
Period -0.038∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.059∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.056∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.037∗∗∗ (0.014)
Neighbors' contributions, ﬁrst lag
cRi−1(t− 1) 0.287∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.252∗∗∗ (0.022)
cLi+1(t− 1) 0.066∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.015 (0.012) 0.042∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.008 (0.022)
Dependent variable: right contribution cRi (t)
Tl Tm Ta,r Th
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
cRi (t− 1) 0.320∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.338∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.346∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.022)
Supergame -0.057 (0.056) -0.124∗∗ (0.053) -0.166∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.121 (0.077)
Period -0.044∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.051∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.051∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.027∗∗ (0.014)
Neighbors' contributions, ﬁrst lag
cRi−1(t− 1) 0.041∗∗ (0.017) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.052∗∗ (0.021)
cLi+1(t− 1) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.265∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.267∗∗∗ (0.022)
Observations 2,496 5,184 4,288 1,696
Number of subjects 48 96 96 40
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table 9: Five-nested multilevel regression of individual left (upper subtable) and right (lower
subtable) contributions (clustered at session, group, supergame, and subject levels).
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Figure 7: Distance Diﬀerence Dki for k = 1, 2, 3
Dki (t)
k Average Std. Dev. Freq.
1 7.150 6.000 12,936
2 8.536 6.844 11,816
3 9.215 7.304 10,696
Total 8.153 6.851 36,480
(a)
D1i (t) D
2
i (t) D
3
i (t)
D1i (t) - 1.377
∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
D2i (t) - 0.661
∗∗∗
(0.000)
D3i (t) -
(b)
Table 10: Summary statistics (a) and multilevel regression (b) of contribution diﬀerences be-
tween public goods which are k−distances away from each-other
Figure 8: Absolute contribution diﬀerences by k-distances away (Dki for k = 1, 2, 3)
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Appendix A - Additional Analysis
Tl Tm Ta Th Total
Average 3.009 3.314 3.635 3.878 3.452
Std. Dev. 2.393 2.739 2.526 2.691 2.618
Freq. 1,536 3,072 3,072 1,280 8,960
Share of (0,0) 16.99% 23.24% 12.92% 14.38% 22.05%
Table 11: Average contribution by treatment in periods 1 to 8
Tl Tm Ta Th Total
Average 2.033 2.596 3.177 3.859 2.769
Std. Dev. 2.111 2.739 2.491 3.053 2.646
Freq. 1,152 2,496 1,600 576 5,824
Share of (0,0) 32.99% 35.54% 18.63% 24.13% 29.26%
Table 12: Average contribution by treatment in periods 9 to 16
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Dependent variable: average group contribution at period t
Pooled(i) T
(ii)
l T
(ii)
m T
(ii)
a T
(ii)
h
Supergame -0.194∗∗∗ -0.080 -0.315∗∗∗ -0.141 0.180
(0.059) (0.121) (0.085) (0.109) (0.136)
Period dummies. Ref. category: period 8
Period 1 1.229∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.272∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 2 1.089∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 3 0.941∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 4 0.871∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 5 0.737∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 6 0.630∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 7 0.486∗∗∗ 0.399∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 9 0.338∗∗∗ 0.024 0.446∗∗∗ 0.328∗ 0.528
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 10 0.437∗∗∗ 0.142 0.510∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.507
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 11 0.366∗∗∗ 0.174 0.405∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.417
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 12 0.279∗∗∗ 0.115 0.335∗∗ 0.133 0.771∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 13 0.216∗∗ -0.087 0.264∗ 0.118 0.882∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 14 0.029 -0.281 0.080 -0.118 0.833∗∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 15 -0.130 -0.288 -0.258∗ -0.068 0.563
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Period 16 -1.002∗∗∗ -1.170∗∗∗ -0.990∗∗∗ -1.055∗∗∗ -0.569∗
(0.098) (0.205) (0.140) (0.191) (0.346)
Constant 3.221∗∗∗ 2.444∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗ 2.603∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.566) (0.365) (0.605) (0.665)
Observations 1,456 288 624 400 144
Supergames lasting 16 periods 65% 75% 81% 52% 45%
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
(i) Five level estimation (treatment, session, supergame and group)
(ii) Four level estimation (session, supergame and group)
Table 13: Multilevel regression of average group contribution. Sample is restricted to su-
pergames lasting 16 periods only
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Left neighbor Right neighbor
Avg. Std.dev. Avg. Std.dev. Freq.
High contr. 6.578 2.712 6.966 2.486 206
Everyone else 3.653 2.985 3.136 2.823 4,082
(a)
Left neighbor Right neighbor
Avg. Std.dev. Avg. Std.dev. Freq.
Low contr. 2.334 2.889 1.573 2.188 955
Everyone else 4.212 2.949 3.821 2.917 3,333
(b)
Table 14: Average contribution received by High/Low type vs. by others in the neighborhood
(Ta only)
Left neighbor Right neighbor
Avg. Std.dev. Avg. Std.dev. Freq.
High contr. 4.960 3.097 4.610 3.307 326
Everyone else 3.199 2.875 3.740 3.008 3,962
(a)
Left neighbor Right neighbor
Avg. Std.dev. Avg. Std.dev. Freq.
Low contr. 2.428 2.777 2.926 2.993 1,075
Everyone else 3.635 2.917 4.101 2.999 3,213
(b)
Table 15: Eﬀect of neighbor's type (High/Low contributors) on individual contribution to other
neighbors (Ta only)
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Appendix B - Inter-group Heterogeneity analysis
This analysis illustrates that purely behavioral spillovers do not exclude heterogeneity of dif-
ferent neighborhoods, even within the same treatment. We visualize average individual contri-
bution across periods25 by "Low" "Medium" and "High" levels, using the same intervals as in
Figure 5. The visual representations of neighborhoods illustrate how voluntary contributions
can vary within and between neighborhoods and across treatments, and provide an intuitive
and immediate impression. Neighborhoods are ordered according to the following criteria:
- Homogeneity in contributions (the same color shade across all eight members);
- Local concentration of high contributors (connected dark color spots); and
- Singular high contributors (isolated dark color spots).
In order to inspire intuition a few remarks are stated.
Remark 1: The left and the right neighborhoods in Figure 9 are quite homogeneous
albeit diﬀering considerably in their degree of voluntary cooperation.
Figure 9: Treatment Tl
Remark 2: The upper left and lower right neighborhoods in Figure 10 diﬀer most
in their contributions.
25Average contribution does not include periods 8 and 16 to exclude endgame behavior.
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Figure 10: Treatment Ta,l
Remark 3: There exist isolated low and high contributors in Figure 11 even who
may co-exist with clusters of similar contribution levels.
Figure 11: Treatment Tm
Remark 4: The upper left corner in Figure 12 is the least cooperative one. It appears
that high voluntary cooperation never had a chance in this neighborhood.
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Figure 12: Treatment Ta,r
Remark 5: Homogeneous "medium" neighborhoods exist (also in treatment Th, see
Figure 13).
Figure 13: Treatment Th
Across almost all treatments one can identify (at lest sub)neighborhoods of homogeneous
contribution levels, whose average contributions become higher from Tl to Tm, from Tm to Ta
and from Ta to Th.
Note also how MPCR aﬀects individual behavior: when the free-riding incentive is sym-
metric and high, only one in 48 subjects (2.08%) is a high contributor; the number of high
contributors increases (6.25%) when considering the left side of the asymmetric treatment, in
spite of the same free-riding incentive. This partly accounts for the similar percentage of low
contributors in Ta (34.37%) and in Th (35%), another corroboration that participants do not
discriminate between their two neighbors as the diﬀerence in MPCR would suggest. The pos-
itive eﬀect of asymmetry suggests it could be exploited in order to boost cooperation while
maintaining the same average incentives.
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Appendix C - Instructions
You are participating in an experiment about economic decision-making. During the experi-
ment, you can earn money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of
others. These instructions describe the decisions you and other participants should take and
how your earnings are calculated. Therefore, it is important to read them carefully.
During the experiment, all interactions between the participants will take place through
computers. It is forbidden to communicate with other participants by any other means. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to answer it. Keep in mind
that the experiment is anonymous, i.e., your identity will not be disclosed.
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the exper-
iment, the points will be converted to Euros at the following exchange rate:
1 point = 1AC .
In the experiment, you will be a member of a group containing a total of eight members,
including you. For the purpose of this experiment, you and the rest of the members in the
group are positioned in a circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbor to the
left and a neighbor to the right.
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You are participating in an experiment about economic decision-making. During the experiment, 
you can earn money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. 
These instructions describe the decisions you and other participants should take and how your 
earnings are calculated. Therefore, it is important to read them carefully. 
During the experiment, all the interaction between the participants will take place through 
computers. It is forbidden to communicate with other participants by any means. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to answer it. Keep in mind that the 
experiment is anonymous, i.e., your identity will not be disclosed.  
During the experiment, your winnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the 
points will be converted to euro at the following exchange rate: 
2 points = 0.5 € 
In the experiment you will be a member of a group containing a total of 8 me bers, including you. 
For the purpose of this experiment you and the rest of the members in the group are positioned in a 
circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbour to the left and a neighbour to the 
right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the experiment, each of you will interact with your two neighbors, and these two neighbors 
are going to be the same two individuals for 1 round.  In the experiment, there will be a total of 4 
rounds. One round lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as it will be explained later). Therefore you will have 
to make either  8 or 16 decisions before the round ends.  At the end of each round, your group 
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
Your	Right	
Neighbour	
You	
Your	Le3	
Neighbour	
Group	
Member	
Group	
Member	
During the expe iment, each of y u w ll in eract with your two neighbors. These two
neighbors will be the same two individuals for one supergame. In the experiment, there will be
a total of four supergames. One supergame lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as will be explained
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later). Therefore, you will have to make either 8 or 16 decisions before the supergame ends. At
the end of each supergame, your group consisting of eight members will be reshued randomly.
For every member, at least one neighbor will be diﬀerent from the previous supergame. Keep
in mind that you do not know the identity of your neighbors so you will not know if both of
your neighbors are new, or just one of them.
How many periods a supergame lasts depends on chance. A supergame will last for 8 periods
with a probability of 1/3, and 16 periods with probability of 2/3.
In each period, you and your two neighbors will be endowed with points. More speciﬁcally,
nine (9) points will be assigned to you for the interaction with your left neighbor, and nine (9)
points will be assigned to you for the interaction with your right neighbor. The same number
of points will be assigned to both of your neighbors, and all other members in your group.
In each period, you will have to decide, individually and independently, how many of the nine
points you are endowed with you will want to contribute to a project with your left neighbor. In
what follows, this is referred to as Project L. Similarly, in each period you will have to decide,
individually and independently, how many of the nine points you are endowed with you will
want to contribute to a project with your right neighbor. In what follows, this is referred to as
Project R.
Keep in mind that you can invest a maximum of 9 points to Project R and a maximum of
9 points to Project L; moreover, you cannot invest your points for Project R into Project L,
and vice versa.
You will retain for yourself the points that you decide not to invest in either project. There-
fore, you will keep for yourself 9−Your contribution to Project L; similarly you will keep for
yourself 9−Your contribution to Project R. For example, you can invest 8 points in project R,
and keep 9− 8 = 1 for yourself, or invest 3 points in Project L and keep 9− 3 = 6 to yourself.
Every member is going to make the decisions simultaneously.
PAYOFFS
Your payoﬀ in each supergame will depend only on your own choices and on those of your
two neighbors
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At the end of each period, your payoﬀ is computed in the following manner:
For Project R: (9−Your contribution) +0.7 ∗ (Your contribution + Your right neighbor's
contribution)
For Project L: (9−Your contribution) +0.7 ∗ (Your contribution + Your left neighbor's
contribution)
EXAMPLE: Let's try to compute your payoﬀ with the example given above. For the purpose
of the example we imagine that both your right and left sided neighbors contribute 8 points.
If you contribute 8 points into Project R, your payoﬀ will be 0.7 ∗ (8 + 8) + 1 = 0.7 ∗ 16 + 1 =
11.2 + 1 = 12.2. Similarly, if you contribute 3 points into Project L, your payoﬀ will be
0.7 ∗ (3 + 8) + 6 = 7.7 + 6 = 13.3.
In each of the successive periods, all group members will simultaneously choose their con-
tributions to Project R and to Project L. Keep in mind that you play multiple periods with
the same participants and that you decide about your own contribution without knowing the
contributions of your neighbors.
At the end of each period, each group member will be informed about own payoﬀs from
Project L and from Project R, contributions by both left and right neighbors, and accumulated
earnings from both projects.
What you will actually earn is:
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select the average payoﬀ you
obtained in one of the four supergames as a ﬁnal payment. Thus your payment will be equal to
the average payoﬀ of supergame 1, or to the average payoﬀ of supergame 2, or to the average
payoﬀ of supergame 3, or to the average payoﬀ of supergame 4. Such a payoﬀ will be converted
to Euros at the exchange rate of 1 point = 1 AC .
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